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felled him, and he was relieved of command. Rather than retiring gracefully,
however, Puller fought the medical examiner’s board for over a year before the
secretary of the Navy informed him in
October 1955 that he would be retired.
For Puller, his forced retirement from active service was the ultimate betrayal by
the commandant and Headquarters, Marine Corps. In his twilight years, however, Puller mellowed a bit and took
personal satisfaction in seeing his family
reach maturity. He volunteered for active
service during the Vietnam War (his request was understandably denied). A vocal critic of government policy during the
war, Puller watched his son, Lewis Puller,
Jr., carry on the Puller name in combat.
As a sidelight, Hoffman provides an intimate portrayal of the relationship between father and son in the elder Puller’s
last days. Lewis Jr., who later recorded
his own experiences in a Pulitzer
Prize-winning autobiography, Fortunate
Son, was at his father’s side when Chesty
Puller, the greatest Marine in history,
succumbed to pneumonia and kidney infection on 11 October 1971.
The Puller who emerges from these pages
is not an altogether appealing figure but
one who merits the accolades that generations of Marines have bestowed upon
him. The fact that his Navy Crosses were
awarded for leadership during critical
stages of battle as opposed to individual
acts of bravery in no way diminishes
what Puller accomplished during his distinguished career. An unparalleled warrior and an enlisted leatherneck at heart,
Chesty Puller remains the most famous
and most revered Marine. It is fitting that
we finally have a biography that does justice to this extraordinary officer.
COLE C. KINGSEED

Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired
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La Bree, Clifton. The Gentle Warrior: General Oliver
Prince Smith, USMC. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ.
Press, 2001. 268pp. $32

Oliver Prince Smith was not present at
Belleau Wood or Chateau Thierry. Neither did he chase Sandino in Nicaragua.
He never served in Shanghai with the 4th
Marines. He missed the fighting on
Guadalcanal and Tarawa—early 1941 saw
him with the 1st Marine Brigade in Iceland, returning to the United States in
May 1942 for an eighteen-month stint in
the newly formed headquarters Division
of Plans and Policies. Consequently,
Smith’s first taste of combat did not
come until early 1944—fully twentyseven years after commissioning—at
New Britain, where he served initially as
chief of staff for the 1st Marine Division
and shortly as commander, 5th Marines,
for the Talasea Peninsula assault. Subsequently, at Peleliu he had the distinct
misfortune to serve as assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division under
Major General William H. Rupertus. He
would finish his World War II service as
Marine deputy chief of staff for the Tenth
Army at Okinawa.
Smith went through the Reserve Officers
Training Corps program at the University of California, Berkeley, and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1917.
He was ordered to Guam, followed by
shipboard duty, then Washington, D.C.,
three years in Haiti, and the Army’s Field
Officer School at Fort Benning in 1931.
Subsequently, Smith taught at Marine
Corps Schools in Quantico, following
which he became the first Marine officer
to matriculate at the French École de
Guerre. Returning to the United States,
he was again assigned as an instructor at
Quantico, where, because of his obvious
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intellectual power, he acquired the nicknames “the professor” and the “student
general.”
Smith was not a colorful character. A
practicing Christian Scientist, he did not
drink (although he did smoke a pipe),
and he did not use profanity. In fact,
when he spoke at all he rarely raised his
voice above a normal speaking level.
“Taciturn” probably describes him best.
Consequently, when in spring 1950, after
serving as Marine Corps assistant commandant, Smith received orders as commanding general, 1st Marine Division,
there was not a little heartburn among
other Marine general officers, which only
intensified when that division deployed
to Korea.
Yet if ever there was an officer with the
right qualifications at the right place at
the right time, it was Major General Oliver Prince Smith.
It was O.P. who worked closely and effectively with Rear Admiral James H. Doyle
on a very short time line to plan the September 1950 landing at Inchon, with
higher echelons back-dating their operation orders to conform with those produced at the lower levels. Like Doyle,
O.P. was a practical-minded, hardheaded
professional who cared not a whit for
high-blown rhetoric or elegant maps,
only for getting the job done. It was O.P.
who wisely resisted great pressure from
his corps commander to accelerate his division’s advance on Seoul in order to
meet an artificial schedule for securing
that city; urgings to make a dangerous
night attack once in Seoul; and attempts
to interfere in his division’s internal
chain of command.
The extraordinary performance of the 1st
Marine Division at Chosin is widely
known. Less obvious was O.P.’s
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contribution to that performance. Again,
he wisely resisted considerable pressure
from his corps commander to quick-pace
the division’s advance to the Yalu. Cognizant of the danger posed by the Chinese entry into the war, O.P. doggedly strove to
keep his division concentrated. Smith developed a main supply route with defensible redoubts that made possible the
division’s long fighting retreat from Chosin
to Hamhung. Earlier, in the belief that the
war would extend well into the bitter Korean winter, he had insisted on coldweather gear for his Marines. He kept in
continuous personal contact with his regimental commanders by means of helicopter (the first field commander to do so) and
jeep, and yet he refrained from interfering
with their exercise of command.
By these deeds, this reviewer is persuaded
that O. P. Smith saved a great many fine
men from certain capture, injury, or
death. Much beloved by his men, O.P. reciprocated; in his personal log he kept
handwritten daily and running casualty
figures for the division. Perhaps the
best-known photo of O. P. Smith is of
him standing alone among graves of his
men in the cemetery at Hamhung.
Smith was neither good news material
nor well known outside Marine circles;
he was a very private and modest person.
For example, he confided to his wife his
deep embarrassment on receiving a Silver
Star from General Douglas MacArthur,
an award he deemed inappropriate for a
division commander not directly in the
line of fire. Such humility and personal
reserve neither attract biographers nor
render their task easy (in Korea he was
easily eclipsed by his 1st Marines commander, the colorful “Chesty” Puller).
Thus, the absence of a biography of
Smith until now is no surprise, but the
lacuna has been a serious one. That there
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is now such a biography is owed to the
perseverance of the publisher’s executive
director, who served in the 1st Marine
Division after the Korean War.
Fortunately for his biographer, O.P. kept
meticulous records of his professional
life, comprising some three dozen boxes
in the Marine Corps University Archives
and, more important, a detailed, daily
personal log of his Korean War service.
La Bree conducted interviews with officers who had served with O.P. to help fill
in the blanks.
Gentle Warrior would have benefited had
the author provided a broader context
for the historical events in which its protagonist participated. It would also have
been improved by more attention to the
first decades of O.P.’s career, which are
largely omitted—official records could
have provided at least grist for the mill
here. That O.P.’s youth and college years
are absent from this account is due principally to his family’s desire for privacy,
which the author respected. Thus we do
not really know the father to the
man—the account really starts with
O.P.’s deployment to Iceland.
Nonetheless, this is a good, honest book.
It is probably not the definitive account
of O.P.’s life and career, but we are fortunate to have it. He emerges as a consummate, dedicated professional military
officer who served his country and his
Marine Corps extremely well and did so
with little fanfare or expectation of public approbation. On more than one occasion, Smith risked his career to speak
truth to power. In short, there is much
worth emulating in the character and career of O. P. Smith. Serving officers
would do well to read this book and absorb its lessons.
DONALD CHISHOLM

Naval War College
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Probert, Henry. Bomber Harris, His Life and Times:
The Biography of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir
Arthur Harris, the Wartime Chief of Bomber Command. London: Greenhill, 2001. 432pp. $34.95

In the 1920s, early in his career, when Arthur Harris commanded 45 Squadron in
Iraq, he was concerned with improving
the accuracy of his unit’s bomb aiming.
Can this be the same man who, twenty
years later, was responsible for leading
the Royal Air Force Bomber Command’s
area-bombing campaign against the cities
of the Third Reich, the apogee of which
was the apocalyptic raid on Dresden in
February 1945?
Yes and no. As Henry Probert demonstrates in his admirable biography of this
most controversial Allied airman, Harris
did indeed stress the need for his bombers to operate efficiently and effectively as
they policed their corner of the British
Empire, and he continued to emphasize
these qualities for the remainder of his
career. Harris cannot be made to bear
personal responsibility for either the
area-bombing strategy in general, or the
Dresden raid in particular. Although
Harris became a lightning rod for postwar criticism of the strategic air offensive, the critical decisions were made
higher up the chain of command by the
Chiefs of Staff , the War Cabinet, and
Winston Churchill. In pointing out this
simple but often overlooked fact,
Probert, like Robin Neillands in his recent The Bomber War (Overlook Press,
2001), seeks to debunk myths and set the
record straight by putting Harris in his
proper historical context.
In some respects this task is not an easy
one, but Probert is well qualified to make
the attempt. A retired RAF air commodore with a long record of service,
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